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Abstract 
 
In England, Since the 1970s, a system of negotiated project-specific agreements between local 
planning authorities and developers/landowners has evolved into the sole mechanism by which part 
of land value uplift ‘released’ by the grant of planning permission is captured by government.  In 
2010, in an attempt to simplify and speed up the planning process – negotiated planning agreements 
were regarded as time-consuming and a brake on development – the Community Infrastructure Levy 
(CIL) was introduced. Originally intended as a simple flat rate charge to replace site-specific planning 
agreements, CIL now sits alongside that mechanism so that developers pay CIL to help fund 
infrastructure provision in the locality, whilst planning agreements help mitigate the impact of their 
development and provide affordable housing. The experience of running a system of negotiated 
planning agreements alongside a non-negotiable infrastructure levy offers an opportunity to 
evaluate these policy shifts in order to assess their strengths and weaknesses and whether there are 
any wider lessons for international discussions of best practice in land value capture.  Drawing on 
survey findings the paper considers the implementation of CIL alongside planning agreements, the 
revenue and expenditure patterns, and the impact of these combined land value capture 
mechanisms on development activity and, in particular, on affordable housing supply. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the period following the Second World War there were several largely unsuccessful attempts in 
England to introduce workable betterment taxes. The last of these, the Development Land Tax, was 
abolished in 1985. Instead, a system of negotiated project-specific agreements between local 
planning authorities and developers/landowners evolved into the sole mechanism by which part of 
land value uplift ‘released’ by the grant of planning permission is captured by government.  In 
addition to cash payments, these planning agreements comprise in-kind contributions towards 
infrastructure, social housing, educational and community facilities and environmental 
improvements. 
 
In 2010, in an attempt to simplify and speed up the planning process – negotiated planning 
agreements were regarded as time-consuming and a brake on development – the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL) was introduced. Originally intended as a simple flat rate charge to replace 
planning agreements, CIL now sits alongside that mechanism so that developers pay CIL to help fund 
infrastructure provision in the locality, whilst planning agreements help mitigate the impact of their 
development, including the provision of affordable housing.   
 
Over the last five years, for political as well as for administrative reasons, a series of amendments to 
CIL and planning agreements have led to what many regard as a complicated set of regulations.  
Payment instalment policies, exemptions for small developments and self-build schemes, reliefs for 
social housing and other exceptional circumstances, restrictions on the pooling of planning 
obligations, the award of credit for re-using vacant buildings and revenue allocations to 
neighbourhood groups have been introduced by central government.  At the local government level, 
planning authorities have been adopting more nuanced CIL charging schedules with differential rates 
depending on land use and location to an extent where, in some cases, CIL is more analogous to a 
development value tax than an infrastructure levy. 
 
The experience of running a system of negotiated planning agreements alongside a non-negotiable 
infrastructure levy offers an opportunity to evaluate how these two mechanisms work in practice. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a literature review that describes the evolution of land value 
capture policies in England, Section 3 explains the operational characteristics of planning 
agreements and the infrastructure levy. Section 4 reports the findings of a survey of local authority 
planning officers, planning consultants and developers that examined experiences of running these 
two land value capture instruments side-by-side. In particular, it considers how much revenue has 
been raised and how is it being used, whether developer contributions vary depending on where 
and when development takes place, the types of development that generate developer 
contributions and how the amount of developer contributions is assessed. A discussion of the 
principal issues arising and some concluding comments are provided in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Because land is scarce and land parcels occupy unique locations (i.e. landowners benefit from 
monopolistic positions) not all accumulated wealth is the result of landowners’ actions. In societies 
where governments fund the provision of infrastructure, services and amenities, landowners may 
benefit from land value uplift as a direct result of this publicly funded investment. Furthermore, 
most countries do not espouse or indeed permit unfettered ownership and exploitation of land, for 
obvious reasons. Local, national and international environmental and planning laws typically provide 
a set of rules that govern the way in which landowners may use their land. Chief amongst these rules 
is the need to obtain planning consent to develop land (including changing its use). In effect, 
substantial increases in land value can occur upon grant of planning consent. In such circumstances 
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the case for a ‘betterment’ tax is strenghtened. Figure 1 illustrates some examples of measures to 
tax infrastructure-based and development rights based betterment. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Alterman (2012) offers a more nuanced categorisation of these instruments, splitting them into 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ measures. The direct measures include the capture of unearned increment 
(e.g. capital gains tax, inheritance tax and transfer tax) and capture of betterment (but specifically 
land tax or betterment levy type instruments). The indirect measures include developer obligations, 
planning gain and impact fees. This distinction may not be readily identifiable, indirect measures 
may be attempts to ‘hide’ the taxation policy. Alterman (2012) argues that, for indirect betterment 
capture instruments, the unearned increment rationale remains in the background. She cites 
planning practice in England, and Planning Circular 05/05 (ODPM, 2005) in particular, that prevented 
planning obligations from being ‘betterment by stealth’ and argued that alternative rationales have 
emerged instead, including the recovery of public investment, provision of public services, 
internalisation and mitigation of negative externalities for example. Also, what began as indirect 
instruments may evolve into direct ones. As this paper will discuss, in England, development-specific 
planning obligations have evolved into methods of land value capture that are now viability tested to 
ensure the amount captured is economically justifiable. 
 
Attempts to introduce direct betterment capture in England have not been successful. The 1909 
Housing Act gave local authorities, when adopting their land use schemes, a “claim to half the 
amount by which any property is increased in value by the making of the scheme” but the claim was 
virtually inoperable due to difficulties in exacting the levy from landowners at the time of approval 
of a land use scheme. Subsequent attempts to introduce national betterment levies, including a 
Development Charge introduced in 1947, a Betterment Levy in 1967, a Development Gains Tax in 
1973 and a Development Land Tax in 1976, have all been repealed. The direct betterment levies 
failed for a mixture of political and administrative reasons (Oxley, 2006). Politically, UK betterment 
taxes failed largely because of a lack of credibility over long-term sustainability of the tax. Each 
attempt at introducing a levy was by a Labour Government and each repeal was by a subsequent 
Conservative Government and ‘[t]here has been a clear incentive to wait for a reversal of the policy 
before applying for planning permission’ (Mirlees, 2011a: 372). The administrative reasons for 
successive failures of direct betterment levies centre on difficulties associated with establishing the 
basis for the tax, specifically, valuation complexity. 
 
In England, for the time-being at least and despite a recent and authoritative call for its serious 
consideration (Mirrlees, 2011b), the death knell has sounded for a nationally imposed betterment 
levy. However, alternative mechanisms have been evolving at the local level. Mirrlees (2011a) and 
Alterman (2012) suggest why indirect or locally implemented betterment capture instruments might 
be preferable to national betterment taxes and levies; they operate under the political radar, have 
been less transparent, are more directly linked to development activity and its potential negative 
impact, and are sufficiently flexible to enable adjustment as political and socio-economic 
circumstances change. Some see the shift from betterment taxation to planning charges as the 
‘marketisation’ of a planning system: 
 
‘Planning obligations are probably the most significant element of the planning system where 
planners are confronted by the need directly to consider (development) economics … [they] have 
become a financial and hence a market orientated mechanism through which the social and 
environmental consequences of development can be determined and their costs met’ (Campbell and 
Henneberry, 2004: 54).  
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Initially running alongside the Development Land Tax but later the sole mechanism for land value 
capture, the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 introduced Section 52 agreements. Renamed 
Section 106 agreements following enactment of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, these 
agreements enable local planning authorities to enter into legal contracts with developers to 
regulate aspects of a development as a condition of the grant of planning permission. In the early 
days, this regulation took the form of site-specific mitigation measures and charges were levied 
according to formulae for each item. Gradually, some planning authorities began to pool financial 
contributions from developers into a combined charge per unit of floor area; see, for example, City 
of London, Thames Gateway Development Corporation, Milton Keynes “infrastructure tariff” 
(Planning Officers’ Society, 2015), a “property tariff” in Swindon and a “strategic tariff” in Ashford 
(Lord, 2009). Amid concern that these tariff-like charges might not meet Government guidance on 
the use of planning obligations (Circular 05/05), in 2002-3 the Local Government Department of the 
then Labour Government considered the introduction of a more formal mechanism, known as an 
Optional Planning Charge. At the same time (2006), the Treasury recommended the introduction of 
a tax on planning gain, known as the Planning Gain Supplement. In the face of strong resistance from 
landowners and developers over its design, and amid concern from local authorities over the role of 
central government in administering the tax, the Planning Gain Supplement was never implemented 
and in the 2007 White Paper Planning for a Sustainable Future a locally determined levy was 
proposed instead. After more consultation, and following enactment of the 2008 Planning Act, the 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) was introduced in 2010. CIL is a local level, tariff-style approach 
to capturing some of the land value uplift resulting from the grant of planning permission. Writing 
before CIL was introduced, Lord (2009) argued that: 
 
‘In developing such mechanisms a central aim has been to sever the link between planning obligations and 
corresponding measures taken to mitigate externalities entailed by site-specific development. Instead, the 
impulse behind the CIL is rather to combine multiple developer-contribution-fed funding streams to 
finance infrastructure projects of regional/national importance.’ 
 
CIL was originally intended to replace S106 agreements but that replacement has not happened. 
Instead, the two mechanisms sit alongside each other so that developers pay CIL to help fund 
infrastructure provision and pay Section 106 to mitigate the impact of their development, including 
the provision of affordable housing. Against this background and evolution of land value capture 
instruments in England, it would seem appropriate to investigate the performance of the current 
dual mechanisms of S106 planning agreements and CIL. Before doing so, Section 3 describes the 
research method and provides a more detailed explanation of these two land value capture 
instruments. 
 
3. Planning Obligations and Community Infrastructure Levies 
 
There have been four Government commissioned studies of S106 planning agreements in England 
over the past decade (Crook et al, 2006, 2008, 2010 and DCLG, 2014). These studies provide 
estimates of the number and financial value of planning agreements, together with detailed analyses 
of the type obligations that were agreed and the experiences of negotiating and agreeing them. 
Building on these four studies, this paper reports the result of a survey undertaken in 2015 of 140 
(out of a total of 326) local planning authorities in England. The survey instrument was a targeted 
questionnaire that was emailed to all 70 local authorities that had adopted a CIL as at March 2015. 
The survey investigated the attitudes and experiences of implementing and operating CIL and of 
running CIL alongside planning agreements.  It provided an insight into the way the introduction of 
CIL is interacting with the use of planning agreements and how far S106 agreements are being scaled 
back. The survey also investigated attitudes and experiences of those local authorities that had not 
adopted a CIL. This sample of 70 ‘non-adopters’ was selected so that it was comparable in terms of 
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local authority type and median house price to the ‘adopters’ sample. The response rate from the 
CIL adopters was 67% and from the non-adopters it was 31%. The overall the response rate from all 
140 local authorities was 49%. 
 
The questionnaire survey was supplemented by local authority case studies. These involved 
interviews with officers from 14 local authorities that had adopted CIL. Case study selection was 
weighted towards authorities that had been operating CIL for longest while also providing a 
reasonable spread in terms of location, type of local authority (district, borough, metropolitan) and 
real estate values. Interviews lasted between forty minutes and an hour and were conducted using a 
discussion agenda. Usually the interviews were with the officer responsible for the operation of CIL 
in the authority. In some cases more than one officer took part in the interview, with the second 
officer usually involved in policy decisions. The discussion focused on the adoption of CIL, CIL 
exemptions and reliefs, CIL and S106 in combined operation, collecting and spending payments, 
handling large-scale developments and the impact on developers and developments, including 
affordable housing. From these local authority case studies 12 developers were also interviewed, 
including a mix of national (5), sub-regional (3) and local developers (or their agents) (4). Interviews 
were undertaken by telephone and lasted about 30 to 45 minutes. The topics mirrored those 
discussed with the local authority interviewees in order to investigate key issues from what were 
often opposing viewpoints.  
 
Planning Obligations 
 
As described in Section 2 above, under Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, 
applicants and local planning authorities are able to enter into legally binding planning agreements 
as a condition of the grant of planning permission. These agreements can require or oblige (hence 
the use of the term ‘planning obligations’) applicants to undertake or provide a variety of measures 
including: 
 On-site and off-site provision of affordable housing and/or land for affordable housing 
 Provision of open space, environmental improvements, ecology, nature conservation, 
allotments and countryside management 
 Provision of sports and community facilities e.g. public toilets, public art, employment and 
training 
 Temporary and permanent highway works, provision or improvement of footpaths and/or 
cycle routes, traffic and parking management, green transport and travel plans, public 
transport improvements 
 Provision of schools or improvements to schools 
 Payments in lieu of the above 
 
Table 1 summarises the main findings of the studies in terms of the number and value of planning 
obligations agreed in the four financial years examined. The studies span a period of substantial 
economic upheaval following the 2008 financial crisis so the figures should be viewed in that 
context. Conservatively speaking, applicants were agreeing to fund approximately £4bn of planning 
obligations each year and that around half of this was targeted towards the provision of affordable 
housing; around 40,000 affordable homes were agreed via planning obligations each year. It should 
be noted that these figures relate to agreed planning obligations, not necessarily delivered. As Table 
2 shows, S106 is an important source of affordable housing supply but completions have been 
significantly less than agreed provision. 
 
Table 1 here 
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Table 2 here 
 
The studies revealed that nearly all local authorities have experience of entering into S106 
agreements and have an affordable housing policy. Those authorities located in the more 
prosperous parts of the country have the highest number of agreements, three quarters of which 
relate to residential schemes. Standard charging has become increasingly common. By 2007-8, 
nearly all authorities surveyed had adopted a planning obligations policy and most were pooling 
financial contributions from developers. Changes in real estate prices was regarded the most 
important factor in explaining changes in the numbers and value of obligations.  
 
Planning agreements, and planning obligations therein, are negotiated on an application-by-
application basis. This means that they enjoy a degree of flexibility and can be tailored to the specific 
circumstances of the scheme, the site and the market conditions at the time of the planning 
application. It also means that there can be a relatively direct link between the obligations provided 
by the applicant and the benefit that they might deliver to the development; a new road or school 
within a residential scheme for example. Even in circumstances where the applicant is required to 
provide facilities that they would rather not include due to its potential impact on viability or 
profitability, such as affordable housing, there is a direct link between obligation and impact. 
Planning obligations, therefore, can be specifically hypothecated, but this comes at a price. Tailoring 
obligations to particular schemes, sites and market conditions can be time-consuming and 
expensive. Valuation advice is often required to ensure the obligations do not render a scheme 
unviable and legal advice is required to draft the planning agreements. Sometimes the agreements 
are cloaked in secrecy and there are several high-profile disputes and judicial reviews that have 
identified this lack of transparency as a serious concern. As a result it became commonplace for local 
planning authorities to set tariffs or standard charges for planning obligations. These, it is argued, 
introduce a degree of certainty into the planning obligation estimation process and remove the need 
for negotiations but, if fixed at too high a level, can cause potential development to be financially 
unviable, particularly in low value or high cost locations and following market downturns. 
 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) 
 
CIL provides local authorities in England and Wales with the opportunity to charge developers a fee 
or levy to help fund infrastructure that is needed as a result of new development. The levy is based 
on the size and type of the new development. CIL is intended to operate alongside a scaled back 
system of section 106 planning obligations, which will only be used for site-specific items and 
affordable housing. CIL is a local levy and it is the responsibility of planning authorities in England 
and Wales to decide whether to introduce it. 
 
In setting CIL rates, local authorities are required to strike a balance between deliverability of 
development plans, desirability of infrastructure and viability of development in their areas1.  
Moreover, scaled-back S106 planning obligations must be necessary to make the development 
acceptable, directly related to the development, and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind 
to the development2. Both S106 and CIL are generally required before development starts. The 
introduction of CIL as a flat-rate charge for all non-site-specific infrastructure apart from affordable 
housing makes S106 the only negotiable element of betterment capture and could increase its 
vulnerability to viability assessments depending on how CIL levels are set. 
 
By the end of August 2015 27% of local authorities in England had adopted a CIL.  Combining these 
                                                          
1 CIL Regulation 14, 2010 CIL Regulations 
2 CIL Regulation 122, 2010 CIL Regulations 
 7 
authorities with those progressing towards adoption, 58% of authorities are engaged with CIL. 
Authorities that have operational CILs are largely concentrated in more affluent parts of the country 
where property and land values are higher.  Table 3 shows that over half of CIL adopters are from 
London and the south east of England.  The two main reasons cited by authorities for not 
implementing CIL were lack of land value to support the levy and the prioritisation of affordable 
housing delivery (which cannot be funded through CIL) over infrastructure provision. Figure 2 shows 
the location of local authorities that have adopted CIL in relation to 2014 residential land values 
(DCLG, 2015).  The relationship between CIL adoption and land value is clear to see. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Local authorities that have introduced CIL have adopted a wide variety of charging policies, ranging 
from flat borough-wide rates to differentiated rates based on geographical zones, scale of 
development, land use or a mixture of these.  Rates vary considerably, with underlying real estate 
values being the principal determinant (there is a clear relationship between residential charge rates 
and house prices) but with other key variables, notably the level of affordable housing being sought, 
having an impact on viability. The majority of authorities have set a CIL rate for residential and retail 
land uses and around a third have set charges for other uses too.  Charges are often differentiated 
for specific types of residential development (private dwellings, student accommodation, retirement 
homes, etc.) and retail development (small units, supermarkets, retail warehouses, etc.) 
 
Focusing on CIL rates for private dwellings, just under a third of local authorities set a single 
geographical rate, a similar proportion set two zones and the remaining third set three or more. 
Whilst the average CIL rate for private residential dwellings across all CIL adopters was £95 per 
square metre, there was substantial variation in the rates charged within (as well as between) 
authorities. Charges are highest in London and the surrounding areas in the south east. At the upper 
end, the majority of charging authorities set maximum residential CIL rates in the £50-£150 per 
square metre range.  Thirteen authorities have a maximum rate in excess of £200 per square metre 
and five of these (all in London) are £400 per square metre or more.  22 authorities have adopted a 
single rate for private residential dwellings; ten of which fall within the £51-100 per square metre 
range; two are below this level (at £40 per square metre) and ten are above (from £125 to £200 per 
square metre). 
 
To compare rates between (rather than within) local authorities an average CIL rate for private 
residential dwellings was estimated by selecting the middle charging zone (or an average of the 
middle two in cases where there was an even number of zones).  Figure 3 shows the middle 
residential rate for each local authority family. Authorities in London and Commuter Belt have the 
highest average residential CIL rates; they are more than double those of Urban England. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
The average CIL rate for each LPA has been plotted against its median house price in Figure 4 (each 
point in the diagram representing one local authority).  This shows a positive relationship between 
median house price and CIL charging rate with rates rising steadily as value increases.  The figure 
also shows that there can be significant variation in rates for private residential dwellings between 
local authorities, even where house prices are broadly similar.  There are several possible 
explanations for this. There may be a very high rate that covers a small geographical area, different 
proportions of affordable housing might be sought by local authorities in areas of similar values, or 
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there might be different levels of anticipated residual S106 payments.  Also, there might be different 
approaches to the viability analysis undertaken by authorities (viability issues are considered in more 
detail below). 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Regarding non-residential land uses, the vast majority (93%) of CIL charging authorities have set 
rates for retail development, which attracts some of the highest of any CIL rates. As with residential 
rates there is diversity in retail rate levels but converging on the £50 to £150 per square metre 
range, with the higher end aimed at larger retailers and the lower end at convenience and 
neighbourhood retail developments. Around a third (32%) have set rates for other non-residential 
land uses too and these typically include office developments and leisure facilities. Several 
authorities have set ‘catch all’ rates for all other types of development. Some of these are low, for 
example three have a rate of £5 per square metre and one has a rate of £10 per square metre, and 
some are high, with examples of £75, £85 and £120 per square metre. 
 
Most of the surveyed local authorities have set a CIL charge for large strategic sites, some at the 
same rate as for other development and others setting a specific rate for large scale developments. 
These large schemes (also referred to as ‘strategic sites’) were perceived to be problematic in terms 
of CIL charging and there was little consensus as to whether CIL plus scaled-back s106 or 
conventional s106 planning obligations without any CIL charge would be the better approach. The 
problem seems to centre on the inflexibility of the CIL chargeable amount as opposed to the 
negotiated S106. With the latter, the parties can agree interim viability appraisals to change the 
amount of planning obligations whereas CIL charges can be phased but the amount cannot be 
varied. One survey respondent commented: “CIL is a more appropriate mechanism for capturing 
infrastructure funding to mitigate the cumulative impact of smaller scale developments.  However it 
would be more appropriate to have maintained S106 as a mechanism for delivering on-site 
infrastructure requirements for large-scale sites.” Other comments supported this view: “CIL may not 
work for very big sites where infrastructure requirements are significant” and “Bigger the 
development the less flexibility with CIL. S106 better for larger sites…” 
 
The average revenue received per CIL charging authority for 2014-15 was £0.7m from residential 
developments, £0.2m from retail and £0.6m from other types of development.  In cases where CIL 
has been in place for two years or more, year-on-year revenue has been increasing significantly from 
an average of £0.2m per charging authority in 2012-13, £0.5m in 2013-14 to £2m in 2014-15. This 
illustrates the time lag between issuing CIL liability notices and receiving revenue. 
 
With regard to CIL expenditure, very few authorities have begun spending on infrastructure at this 
stage. The local authority interviews revealed that there are still issues, especially for local 
politicians, surrounding the disconnection between where CIL is collected and where it is spent.  The 
local authority case studies highlighted widespread acknowledgement that CIL revenue will not be 
sufficient to fund all the items specified in expenditure schedules. Local authorities are therefore 
putting in place governance arrangements to identify priorities.  Moreover, CIL revenue will need to 
be combined with other funding sources to maximise infrastructure delivery.  In some instances CIL 
collected in the early years was less than anticipated, for example: "...make sure people understand 
that CIL is only one element of the funding available.... CIL is generating less money in early years 
than anticipated...”, “… not enough CIL money to pay (for R123 list priorities) - this is a transitional 
period but there is a problem...” and “It (CIL money collected) won't cover more than 30% of costs…” 
 
4. Running CIL alongside S106 
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The CIL charging rates and the amounts of S106 sought from developers is regulated by the use of 
financial viability assessments, which limit the amount of CIL/S106 to a ‘viable’ proportion of the 
land value uplift that flows from the grant of planning permission.  In practice, this approach has 
proved difficult to administer for reasons that centre on the use of these viability assessments, 
including: 
 
 An absence of evidence on which to base valuations of a development site before and after the 
grant of planning permission 
 Difficulties in agreeing how much of the land value uplift should be allocated to developer 
obligations under CIL/s106 
 A lack consensus on how to produce viability assessments that can cope with the dynamics of 
real estate development 
 
In theory, CIL should have no impact on development viability since it is merely a standardised 
mechanism for collecting a financial contribution that would otherwise have been collected through 
S106. The one exception to this rule is small sites (typically less than ten units), which local 
authorities had tended to exempt from S106 negotiations. The importance of the contribution from 
all sites, and not just large-scale development, was emphasised by a number of interviewees, either 
as a reason for an increase in the total S106/CIL contributions or to offset a reduction in the S106 
contribution from larger schemes. 
 
Before the introduction of CIL, typical S106 planning obligations included education, libraries and 
transport measures.  These facilities and services are now to be funded through CIL and, with the 
exception of affordable housing, any remaining ‘scaled-back’ S106 requirements are typically limited 
to ‘minor measures’, open space and children’s play areas.  It has proved difficult to source numeric 
estimates of the scale of the reduction in S106 payments on a per dwelling basis, the few examples 
given in the survey suggested that S106 payments had reduced from around £1,500 per dwelling to 
£1,000 or from £8,000 per dwelling to £3,000 with CIL in place. In addition to the reduced level of 
S106, three interviewees specifically mentioned that the number of S106 agreements had reduced 
because of the introduction of CIL. None reported an increase. Evidence about payment of S106 pre- 
and post-CIL on non-residential schemes is extremely limited but where comment was made it was 
emphasised that schemes varied so much in character, with many including replacement space, that 
no clear picture emerges, there are simply ‘winners and losers’.    
 
In terms of the total S106 and CIL receipts from pre and post-CIL adoption, there is a mixed picture.  
Only three authorities were clear that total receipts have increased with CIL in place, three indicated 
that they think the total receipts will remain about the same, three anticipate decrease and the 
remainder do not yet have sufficient information to make a judgment. A general finding from the 
case studies is that there is a dip in the combined S106/CIL contributions immediately post adoption 
of CIL, compared with the scale of S106 contributions pre adoption. There was no single explanation 
as to why some authorities are collecting less with CIL in place; reasons put forward included: “In 
general, the situation might have been better than pre-CIL in terms of contribution levels, especially 
given [the number] of small developments (in our area) but for the (recent) exemptions…” “Overall 
seem to be collecting less because are getting a steadier flow of income whereas before, s106 
payments arrived in large single payments … now getting more of a trickle…” 
 
The developer case studies provided a very different view on the scale of payments requested by 
local authorities before and after the adoption of CIL. Of the nine developers who expressed a view, 
six stated that payments had increased post CIL with phrases such as ‘massively’ and ‘increased 
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substantially’ being used.  Three specific examples were given of the level of increase in costs: from 
£3,000 per dwelling pre CIL to £10,000 with CIL and scaled-back s106 in place; another that 
payments had ‘doubled’; and another that payments had increased by ‘between 5 and 10 times’. For 
the other three developers, the general view was that there had been no overall change in the level 
of payments and/or that it is difficult to tell, as no two sites are the same. 
 
Respondents to the survey had differing views about how scaled-back s106 payments and CIL were 
operating together.  Just over half (25) of surveyed CIL adopters felt that planning obligations are 
now simpler and quicker to agree post CIL.  16 felt that they were not and two thought that it was 
too early to tell.  Many comments reflected the ease and speed of the CIL process, particularly when 
compared to previous s106 negotiations.  One respondent commented that the process is “Easier to 
administer and seek outstanding contributions from developers.”  Another stated, “We have found 
the process generally to be a lot simpler than the regulations suggest.”  One respondent noted that 
the quantity of s106 agreements had fallen dramatically following the introduction of CIL: “We have 
seen approx. 90% reduction in s106 agreements.” One of the responses received gave some 
indication as to why the procedure was more straightforward post-CIL: “There are fewer heads of 
terms the developer has to enter into … S106 obligations … tend to be standard and require less 
negotiation… There is a lot more consistency as the [authority] endeavours work with a template 
agreement and make amendments only when necessary.”  Another respondent concurred: “There is 
now less complexity, as only a limited number of s106 agreements are now required, chiefly for 
affordable housing.” Other, usually scheme-specific, types of S106 contributions were being sought, 
including play equipment, open space, and some transport measures but the number of these was 
relatively low and no clear pattern emerged. 
 
Many of the case study local authorities echoed the positive views of CIL with half seeing the 
combined process of charging CIL and negotiating scaled-back s106 requirements as a simpler 
process.  For the case study authorities, as in the questionnaire survey, this is largely explained by 
the reduction in the number of s106 requirements to negotiate, for example: "overall is less onerous 
and saves time", “It [introduction of CIL] has resolved these arguments. For specific sites its (i.e. 
negotiation re s106) not necessarily disappeared … but we can focus on key mitigation elements of 
schemes - it's a positive” and “S106 contributions secured through negotiations usually works quite 
well…” 
 
However, not all CIL adopters held these positive views. Three respondents felt that the process of 
obtaining planning obligations had not improved, mainly because of the procedures required in 
applying CIL: “For those applications that smoothly move through each of the intended stages of the 
CIL process, the amount of additional administration and documentation is minimal. However, a 
significant proportion requires extensive additional correspondence i.e. requesting documents, 
explaining procedures, notifying liable parties of surcharges/legal action, responding to complaints, 
etc.” Other comments (made by seven respondents) indicated the complexity that remains when 
negotiating site-specific s106 planning obligations. Three case study authorities considered that the 
introduction of CIL had made s106 negotiations more complex, particularly in the case of larger sites. 
 
Developers (from the developer case studies) generally felt the process of negotiating s106 
agreements with CIL in place was no different from the situation pre-CIL. For example: 
“One would hope that a benefit of CIL is speed. It takes a long time to get planning permission - 
factor in a year for planning. Substantial time taken in discussing and negotiating S106 and getting 
document agreed. This has not changed even if just includes affordable housing.” Similarly, 
“Preferred the old system - thought CIL would streamline s106 process and thought this was a good 
idea but still require s106 charges so end up with CIL and s106. No change in the amount of time 
negotiating s106…” Only one out of the 12 developers interviewed thought that the process was 
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now easier “…as you know what you have to pay”. 
 
One of the key differences between CIL and planning obligations that was highlighted in the 
interviews was that CIL is a fixed levy and S106 is negotiable. This has led to concerns that, where 
scheme viability is an issue, there will be a reduction in planning obligations sought and, notably, a 
reduction in affordable housing provided. Negotiating affordable housing contributions remains 
central to the process of agreeing scaled-back planning contributions as these comments from the 
questionnaire survey demonstrate: “The council has scaled back its planning obligation requirements 
since adoption of CIL. However, affordable housing was already the most difficult S106 item to 
negotiate, and this remains the case.” In addition, “Site-specific needs have not changed; in addition 
the question of viability of affordable housing is now raised more frequently.” 
 
However, the questionnaire survey of CIL adopters showed that only three authorities felt that the 
introduction of CIL had affected the delivery of affordable housing, with one stated “CIL was 
delivered alongside a review of the Local Plan including the affordable housing targets. In a number 
of locations the proportion of affordable housing sought reduced in order to achieve the necessary 
infrastructure investment” and another that “…on a few marginal schemes a reduction in affordable 
housing provision has been accepted when accompanied by an appropriate viability assessment, 
however this was the same under the S106 regime.” On the other hand, 33 authorities felt that CIL 
had not had an impact on the delivery of affordable housing. Other authorities felt that it was too 
soon to tell. Turning to the 14 case study authorities, only two commented that the introduction of 
CIL had had a direct impact on the delivery of affordable housing. In one case, this had affected the 
tenure mix of the affordable housing achieved (although the overall percentage had held up) and the 
other authority had been achieving a lower percentage post CIL. Half of the case studies said that 
there had been no change (or only a minor decrease) and the others either did not know or felt that 
it was too early to tell. In one case, a downturn in delivery of affordable housing was attributed to 
the then national site size threshold for affordable housing of ten dwellings. Another respondent 
commented that there are “Difficulties with or without CIL, it is resisted regardless.” Changing 
market conditions were also identified by some interviewees with two mentioning that ‘improving 
market conditions’ had overcome any detrimental impact that CIL might have on viability. Another 
interviewee commented that affordable housing delivery had been declining prior to the 
introduction of CIL and its continuing decline post-CIL was part of this wider trend.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Administration 
 
Local authorities generally felt that CIL was relatively straightforward to administer, the process is 
transparent and charging is clear and predictable. CIL rate setting, charging and spending are all 
administered at the local level. Whilst this devolved mechanism empowers decentralised decision-
making, what results is a patchwork tax. Decisions about whether to charge or not, what rates to 
charge and types and locations of development activity should be liable are made on an authority-
by-authority basis. Once a local authority has adopted CIL, the levy is non-negotiable. The CIL rate or 
rates are fixed at the local level and can vary between localities and land uses. It is only possible to 
alter these rates when CIL is periodically reviewed, perhaps to bring them into line with market 
values. Planning obligations, on the other hand, are negotiated on a scheme-by-scheme basis but in 
the context of adopted planning policies where they exist, including targets for affordable housing. 
This dual approach seems to be at odds with the views of some commentators. For example, the 
DCLG (2007) regarded individually negotiated S106 agreements as “an effective device but not a very 
efficient one”, and Ball (2010) recommended that “Once CIL is introduced, it would seem sensible to 
fix S106 levels in the same way and preferably simultaneously; rather than to have two divergent 
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approaches, one of which is subject to length and costly negotiation and contentious requirements.” 
Most local authorities have scaled back S106 planning agreements to encompass affordable housing 
and site-specific infrastructure requirements. 
 
There have been a number of amendments to the original CIL regulations, including several 
exemptions and reliefs from the levy such as exemption for small sites, self-build developments, 
residential annexes and extensions, and vacant building credit. These have undermined any 
anticipated consistency in CIL charging regimes. Perhaps the most concerning implication of local 
rate setting for CIL is the spatial inequality of revenue potential. Authorities in the affluent parts of 
the country, and in London and the south east of England in particular, are able to charge CIL at 
levels that should contribute significantly towards infrastructure funding. Whereas it is unlikely that 
authorities in less affluent areas will be able to raise sufficient revenue from CIL to contribute 
meaningfully towards infrastructure investment. The result will be a widening gap between these 
two groups of authorities and a growing disparity between infrastructure investments. 
 
Viability 
 
A key aspect of betterment taxation, whether direct or indirect, is getting the amount of land value 
capture right – a balance between revenue raising potential and maintaining supply of development 
land. This is a particular issue for countries with privatised ownership of land. Since the tax is event-
driven rather than recurrant, if taxpayers (landowners) feel that the tax is too high they can ‘opt’ not 
pay the tax by not developing their land, thus restricting the supply of new land for commercial and 
residential development. This balance between maximising betterment (although not referred to as 
such by the UK Government) and maintaining developmnent land supply has been the focus of 
planning policy in England over recent years. Policy now dictates that the amount of CIL/S106 
payment must not compromise the financial viability of a proposed development, but determining 
when viability is compromised by the amount of payment has proved problematic to say the 
least. Development viability appraisal has emerged as a method of assessment of the financial 
impact of planning payments on development viability. A range of appraisal models has been applied 
but all are founded upon a ‘residual’ approach to valuing land; a method that has long been 
criticised by the various professions that have had to use it (Coleman et al. 2012). Nevertheless, 
these appraisal models now play a central role in local planning authorities’ policy formation 
regarding targets for planning obligation payments and, at a project scale, are the nexus for 
negotiations and arbitration between developers, landowners and planners (McAllister et al, 2015). 
 
UK Government policy requires S106 planning obligations and CIL to be tested for economic viability 
in forward planning documents, documents that remain in force for significant periods of time and 
often over market cycles.  Consequently, planning obligations are largely a fixed cost; ‘largely’ 
because, although a CIL is set, S106 costs can be negotiated on a site-by-site basis.  So planning 
obligations are charged on a geared surplus or residual sum, and the charging is done on an area-
wide basis over market cycles.  As a result CIL rates have tended to be quite low and planning 
obligations remain as the ‘flex’ to be negotiated at the time a planning application is submitted.  This 
means that opportunities to obtain higher amounts of levy or obligation from more profitable sites 
are lost. Alterman (2012) suggests that governments should have well trained professionals to 
negotiate with developers or to develop preset formulae of impact assessment. The professionals 
need to be knowledgeable in real estate economics to be able to assess the limits of how much may 
be exacted from the developer without “killing” the projects. Local government should monitor land 
prices in order to be able to challenge developers’ arguments that the exactions in fact raise the cost 
of housing or other products. There should be enough transparency in negotiated exactions to help 
withstand legal challenges (yet full disclosure is often not possible in order to protect the legitimate 
economic interests of the developers). 
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Revenue and expenditure 
 
With regard to revenue, CIL seems to work best in urban areas where there is plenty of development 
taking place. Set at a low rate and for many types of development, CIL is capable of generating a 
regular flow of infrastructure revenue. It also has the advantage of being able to be dedicated to 
large citywide infrastructure projects such as light rail, trams or other similar infrastructure. 
However, it would appear from the investigations undertaken as part of this research that CIL is not 
performing in the way that was originally intended. Fundamentally, there would appear to be a 
substantial shortfall between revenue and planned expenditure. Although opinion varied, the 
consensus at this early stage of CIL implementation was that there had not been a negative effect on 
affordable housing supply. 
 
A widely held view amongst developers was that there is no direct link between the CIL revenue that 
a development generates and the infrastructure that it is used to fund. Moreover, most developers 
felt that level of contributions had increased after the introduction of CIL, whereas local authority 
opinion was more divided. Regarding the amount of levy (as a proportion of land value uplift), there 
are concerns over the cumulative impact of multiple land value capture mechanisms and priority of 
charge. Because CIL and S106 are administered separately, landowners and developers feel as 
though they are ‘paying twice’ for infrastructure. In London, there is a GLA CIL, borough-wide CILs 
and S106. CIL takes priority over S106 (and within S106, scheme mitigation measures take priority) 
so if viability is marginal then community benefits such as affordable housing are most at risk from 
lack of funding.  
 
Turning to the flexibility of S106 and CIL, specifically in terms of review and adjustment of rates (for 
market, political reasons), it is important to maintain some consistency and longevity of policy in 
land value capture because uncertainty encourages landowners to exercise their option to defer 
sale. S106 policy targets are unable to respond timely to market dynamics. In addition, it is difficult 
to cyclically adjust CIL. Consequently, rates kept low. The problem centres on a static viability model 
that is applied through time: fixed amounts of planning obligations mean that landowners receive 
excessive prices in an upturn relative to planning obligations and insufficient return in a downturn.  
Various compromises have been introduced including site-by-site negotiations, low, dynamic targets 
and differential targets for various types of change of use and locations. It is questionable whether 
these measures provide a robust, equitable split of land value uplift. 
 
It is too early to identify examples of spending but both S106 and CIL do offer clarity over 
expenditure items. S106 benefits from a close association between revenue collection and 
expenditure in terms of location and timescale whereas CIL does not, but the scaling back of S106 
means that scheme-specific expenditure has been compromised. CIL does not facilitate 
redistribution of revenue to local authority areas that are unable to raise sufficient revenue 
themselves. As Alterman (2012) points out, these instruments are often applied case by case 
without ensuring equality among landowners, are open to political and legal challenges regarding 
bias and favouritism, revenue often unpredictable as it is dependent on economy/market and 
negotiation and the amount of revenue may only be small proportion of unearned increment. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Tariff-style CIL provides up-front revenue, a relatively predictable revenue stream (at least more 
predictable than S106) due to the set fees and schedule of liable developments and, via annual 
reporting, a more transparent breakdown of revenue and expenditure over time. CIL has been levied 
on a wider spectrum of development sizes and types than S106 (although diminished because of 
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exemptions). Local authorities in England have found, though, that CIL requires high set-up costs and 
on-going administration is time-consuming and costly, particularly if regular reviews are anticipated. 
A flat rate, up-front levy seems to be less appropriate for large development schemes constructed 
over long periods of time, particularly phased housing schemes. There is a question mark over 
whether many local authority CILs will generate sufficient revenue to fund the infrastructure 
spending requirements set out in CIL charging schedules. Relatedly, developers seem unhappy with 
the disconnection between revenue collection on the one hand and delivery of infrastructure on the 
other, which may be temporally and geographically remote from the scheme that generated the 
funding. 
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Figure 1: Betterment taxation instruments 
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Source of data: DCLG (2015) Land value estimates for policy appraisal 
 
Figure 2: CIL adopters in England as at March 2015 (outlined in blue) overlaying 2014 land value estimates 
(darker shades represents higher land values) 
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Figure 3: Average residential CIL rate by local authority family 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Median house price and average residential CIL rate for each local authority
  
Table 1: Planning obligations agreed 
Year of survey: 
(financial year to which each survey relates): 
2006 
(2003/04) 
2008 
(2005/06) 
2010 
(2007/08) 
2014 
(2011/12) 
Average number of planning agreements per 
local authority 
25 25 30 20 
Number of affordable homes 31,500 44,400 48,000 32,000 
Estimated value of affordable housing 
obligations 
£1.2bn £2bn £2.6bn £2.3bn 
Estimated value of planning obligations, 
excluding affordable housing 
£0.7bn £2bn £2.2bn £1.4bn 
Estimated total value of planning obligations  £1.9bn £4.0bn £4.8bn £3.7bn 
Note: values are nominal figures 
 
 
Table 2: Affordable homes completed through S106 
1999/00 9,200 
2000/01 9,300 
2001/02 10,300 
2002/03 12,600 
2003/04 16,400 
2004/05 18,200 
2005/06 23,900 
2006/07 25,800 
2007/08 27,300 
2008/09 32,300 
2009/10 29,100 
2010/11 29,000 
2011/12 17,000 
2012/13 15,600 
2013/14 16,200 
Source: Whitehead (2007) and Brownill et al (2015) 
 
 
Table 3: Number of local authorities that have adopted CIL 
Th
e 
N
o
rt
h
 North East 0 
North West 6 
Yorkshire & Humber 3 
East Midlands 2 
West Midlands 3 
Th
e 
So
u
th
 East of England 14 
London 27 
South East 22 
South West 13 
 
 
